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In the Search for Justice: Passion and the
Historiography of Law and Race in the
Writings of Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
Robert J. Cottrol*
History and the American legal profession are, of course, not
strangers to each other. Lawyers constantly produce histories
seeking to convince courts that rulings favorable to their clients
best fulfill the intent of past legislators or court precedents now
only dimly remembered. Judges also write history in an effort to
convince their peers, the bar, and indeed the public that their pro-
nouncements are not peculiar innovations, but instead, are consis-
tent with both the way the law was originally envisioned and its
subsequent evolution. This history produced by the bar and bench
is often of a mixed quality, frequently suspect as pure history,
whatever its persuasiveness as an argument for the direction the
law should take. Some attorneys and jurists have taken the study
of legal history beyond the usual precincts of courtroom argumen-
tation and decision drafting and have made lasting contributions to
the way we see the past and the law's development in the past.
Contributions by jurists include writings both from the bench-
Associate Justice Benjamin R. Curtis' dissent in Dred Scott I and
Associate Justice Hugo Black's discussion of the intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment in applying the Bill of
Rights to the states2 come to mind--and for the larger educated
public, of which Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s
The Common Law 3 is a memorable example.
Despite this intermingling of law and history, it is the rare
lawyer or judge whose efforts demonstrate the kind of mastery of
both historical insight and historiographical technique that truly
expands our understanding of the past. Rarer still is the lawyer or
judge, who while acting as an historian, gives us new insights, not
* Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law--Camden. A. B. 1971, Ph.D.
1978, Yale University; J. D. 1984, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 564-633 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
2. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (rel-
evant discussion is labeled: Appendix).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881).
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only into the development of law in the past, but into the evolu-
tion of social conditions as well. This has been the important con-
tribution of Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. whose historical
writings, focusing on the development of the law of race in Ameri-
can society, have taught us much about this society's most endur-
ing problem and helped us to see both our legal and social histories
in an important new light.
Judge Higginbotham's writings reflect many of the virtues
common to good historians: familiarity with the secondary litera-
ture, wide exploration of long obscured primary sources, and a
clear narrative style that compels the reader's interest. If these
were Judge Higginbotham's sole virtues as an historian, they
would be enough to make his writings valuable contributions to
the existing literature. However, Judge Higginbotham brings
something more to his study of the past. He is an historian
animated by a passion, motivated by a knowledge of passion de-
nied, and profoundly aware of the importance of that denial in the
shaping of the history of our nation. His is a knowledge borne of
personal experience. He properly prefaces In the Matter of Color,4
his study of law and race in colonial America, with a personal rec-
ollection of his encounter with racial discrimination as a freshman
at Purdue University in 1944.5 By doing so, he identifies himself as
one for whom the American dilemma of racism in a normatively
egalitarian society is more than just an academic consideration.
But his recounting of his personal experience does more; he re-
minds us of the links between our past and our present and how
the search for racial justice in the present must inevitably involve
coming to grips with our troubled and troubling history.
It is with this concern-the desire to make sense of the often
insensible problem of race in America-that Judge Higginbotham
began his sojourn as an historian. His most comprehensive work,
In the Matter of Color, traces the problem to its origins: colonial
America. In that work, as he freely notes at the outset, Judge Hig-
ginbotham seeks an answer to the most puzzling and vexing ques-
tion of American race relations, one posed by Associate Justice
Marshall when he argued for the plaintiffs in the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education; that is, why blacks, of the many
groups that inhabit the United States, have been subject to the
most persistent and enduring discrimination.6 His is, in short, an
4. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the American
Legal Process: the Colonial Period (1978) [hereinafter In the Matter of Color.
5. Id. at VII-X.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); supra note 4, at 4.
[Vol. 9:441
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
inquiry into the origins of the American caste system. And, as his
study demonstrates, the answer is by no means a simple one. The
English settlers of seventeenth century North America were heirs
to a legal and cultural tradition that knew neither slavery7 nor an
especially degraded social position for blacks.8 Both slavery and a
unique pariah status for blacks grew in the American milieu, an
early American legacy that endures to the present.
In the Matter of Color traces the evolution of law and custom
with respect to race in six colonies: Virginia, Massachusetts, New
York, South Carolina, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. Perhaps the
most illuminating of these discussions is the chapter focusing on
Virginia.9 As Judge Higginbotham has noted elsewhere, he claims
the legacy of Virginia as his own.10 And indeed, Virginia presents
a compelling paradox for all students of American constitutional-
ism. If Virginia is widely and justly celebrated for producing
statesmen who contributed much to the American constitutional
concepts of limited government and individual liberty, Virginia
must also be recognized for the major role it played in creating the
system of castes and slavery that has cast a long shadow on Ameri-
can life.11
In his examination of Virginia's evolution as a slave society,
Higginbotham begins with the murky origins of Virginia's racial
history, the importation of "twenty Negers" into Jamestown in
1619. The status of the earliest black involuntary immigrants in
Virginia has been the subject of historiographical controversy for
generations. Statutory enslavement was not formally enacted un-
til 1660.12 The earliest Africans in Virginia appear to have been
treated as indentured servants, occupying a status not that differ-
ent from their white counterparts. In time, that status changed.
The singling out of blacks from other temporarily unfree persons,
namely, indentured servants, apprentices, seamen, and others; and
the creation of a class permanently in bohdage who would live out
unfree lives and who knew that their children would meet the
7. 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederick Maitland, The History of English Law 35-
37, 412, 424, 472, 529 (2d ed. 1898).
8. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Book Review 56 Tul. L. Rev.
1107, 1112-18 (1982) (reviewing In the Matter of Color).
9. See generally supra note 4.
10. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., West Virginia's Racial Heritage: Not Always
Free, 86 W. Va. L. Rev. 3, 5 (1983) [hereinafter West Virginia's Racial Heritage].
11. Historian Edmund S. Morgan explores this paradox at great length in Ed-
mund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial
Virginia (1975).
12. Supra note 4, at 21.
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same fate, is one of the most important stories of colonial Virginia
and indeed, colonial America.
Judge Higginbotham's able rendition of that story is signifi-
cant both for the intrinsic value of the story and for the important
methodological lesson that he teaches legal and social historians.
Much has been made in the last two decades or so of the need to
expand the historian's horizon, to relate the past experiences not
only of the major figures who participated in the great political
struggles of their day, but to also tell the stories of the often inar-
ticulate poor who left few written records of their experiences. In
the last generation, significant steps have been made towards that
end. Practitioners of the new social history have done much to tell
us about demographic conditions, aggregate property ownership,
crime and litigation rates, and migration patterns among the ordi-
nary persons of the past. A considerable amount of this work has
focused on the colonial era.1 3 In the Matter of Color reminds us of
the people and their individual triumphs and tragedies; people who
would otherwise be lost to history. Judge Higginbotham demon-
strates that individual cases, the raw material or primary sources
of legal history, can tell us not only of the development of law, but
also about the day to day lives of ordinary people who lived under,
and sometimes outside, the law. Judge Higginbotham uses the
cases and statutes from early Virginia, and those of the other colo-
nies, to introduce us to real people living out their lives against the
backdrop of increasing racial restriction. We learn of one Hugh
Davis, a white man, who is ordered whipped for having sexual re-
lations with a black woman. 14 We learn of statutes which provide
strong evidence that Virginia planters were afraid that black
slaves and white servants would make common cause.I5 Also we
learn of the fear of interracial sexual unions and the origins of one
of the nation's oldest and most persistent taboos.16
But Judge Higginbotham's most important contribution in In
the Matter of Color is to show how the early American experience
with race and law set the stage for the large and tragic drama that
was nineteenth century American slavery and abolition. He traces
13. See e.g., Phillip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and
Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (1970); David T. Konig, Law and Soci-
ety in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629-92 (1979); William E. Nelson, Dis-
pute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825 (1981).
14. Supra note 4, at 23.
15. Id. at 34-35.
16. Id. at 36-47. Judge Higginbotham explored this area in greater depth in a
collaborative article done with lawyer and anthropologist Barbara Kopytoff. See A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in
the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967 (1989).
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the histories of his selected states to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, looking towards the end of legal slavery that would take
place in the three northern states and the strengthening of the in-
stitution that would take place in the three southern ones. His ex-
amination of the Declaration of Independence reminds us of the
only partially fulfilled promise of that document and the flawed
idealism it represented. His discussion of the English case Somer-
sett v. Stuart 17 is used to contrast, not only English and American
jurisprudence with regard to slavery, but the fortunes of the Eng-
lish anti-slavery movement with its American counterpart as
well.18
Judge Higginbotham's concern with the irony and lost prom-
ise of the revolutionary era is continued in his study of race and
law in West Virginia: West Virginia's Racial Heritage: Not Always
Free.19 West Virginia's racial history has been less well studied
than that of the "Older Dominion" from which it seceded. Judge
Higginbotham places West Virginia's racial heritage against the
background of the larger Virginian racial culture from which it
sprang. In this essay, he again forces the reader to confront the
paradox of revolutionary Virginia, raising the disturbing question
of whether we should regard the Commonwealth that produced
Jefferson and Madison as the mother of statesmen, or the mother
of slavery?20 This profoundly important question, raised at the be-
ginning of the discussion, helps Judge Higginbotham frame his ex-
amination of the western part of Virginia, the region that
ultimately broke away to form a new state. Although West Vir-
ginia had few slaves and a small black population, the Virginia ra-
cial legacy exerted a profound influence on the state. If the
nonslaveholding whites of West Virginia disliked the peculiar in-
stitution that had developed in the plantation South, they were
also hostile to a free black presence in their state.21 Judge Higgin-
botham's detailing of West Virginia's Civil War era legislation
prohibiting both free black settlement and slavery relates an im-
portant chapter in the history of American race relations. The
hostility in many parts of the country to any black presence is
moving testimony to the extent to which colonial era decisions re-
garding race impacted large segments of the country, even those
17. Supra note 4, at 313 (citing King's Bench: 12 George III A.D. (1771-1772)
Lofft, 20 Howell's State Trials).
18. Id. at 313-68.
19. See supra note 10.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 22.
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areas free or largely free of a slave presence.22
Judge Higginbotham's way of viewing the continuity between
our distant racial past and our more recent racial history can also
be seen in his examination of the law of race as it developed in an-
other border state: Missouri. His work, Race, Sex, Education and
Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Per-
spective,23 examines the jurisprudence of race and slavery in a
state whose racially restrictive practices gave the modern civil
rights movement two of its earliest Supreme Court victories, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer 24 and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.25 Like
his other explorations in legal history, Missouri Jurisprudence il-
lustrates the often tragic path of America's racial history by hu-
manizing its subjects. We are introduced in this article to Celia, an
antebellum Missouri slave woman executed for killing her owner
while resisting his efforts to rape her. Celia's is a story that at
once educates and horrifies us, illustrating with one stark illumi-
nating example both the perversion of justice and the abject subju-
gation of a people that was slavery in the United States. It is with
this background that Judge Higginbotham prepares us for the sub-
sequent interaction of law and race in Missouri's history.
Judge Higginbotham's historical writings are not those of a
detached observer perusing the archives merely to settle academic
controversies. His writings are part of a passionate search for jus-
tice, part of a realization that law, whether past or present, is ulti-
mately about the people, the individuals who live under enacted
statutes and court pronouncements. That Judge Higginbotham has
managed to combine this passion with the professional rigor of the
legal historian more than vindicates the intellectual odyssey of the
former sixteen year old Purdue University freshman who asked
himself why blacks were singled out for special ignominy.26 I hope
his journey and the writings about his discoveries continue for
some time to come, for he has much to teach historians, lawyers,
and indeed, all concerned with the nation's most difficult problem.
22. Id.
23. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurispru-
dence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U.L.Q. 673 (1989)
[hereinafter Missouri Jurisprudence].
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
26. Supra note 4, at VIII.
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